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PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE INTERNET OF
(INSECURE) THINGS: SHOULD MANUFACTURERS BE
LIABLE FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY HACKED DEVICES?
Alan Butler*

INTRODUCTION
On Tuesday, September 20, 2016, the website KrebsOnSecurity
(“Krebs”), a blog run by a prominent cybersecurity reporter, was hit
with one of the largest cyberattacks ever recorded.1 Although
Krebs’s site was not taken down by the initial attack, it was forced
offline for several days after his network security provider refused to
continue protecting the site pro bono.2 According to a report commissioned by Akamai, Krebs’s former security provider, the average
cost of a denial-of-service (“DoS”) attack can be as high as $1.5 million.3 The attack on Krebs’s site was larger than most previous
attacks by several orders of magnitude and was unique because it
was carried out by an army of more than a million hacked consumer devices. A month later, Internet access was disrupted across
the East Coast and in other areas of the U.S. after another similar
DoS attack was launched against Dyn, a major Internet service provider.4 At the peak of the Dyn attack, the network of hacked devices
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1.
See Brian Krebs, KrebsOnSecurity Hit With Record DDoS, KREBSONSECURITY (Sept. 21,
2016), https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/09/krebsonsecurity-hit-with-record-ddos/.
2.
Brian Krebs, The Democratization of Censorship, KREBSONSECURITY (Sept. 25, 2016),
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/09/the-democratization-of-censorship/.
3.
PONEMON INST., 2015 COST OF CYBER CRIME STUDY: GLOBAL 7 (2015), http://
www.cnmeonline.com/myresources/hpe/docs/HPE_SIEM_Analyst_Report_-_2015_Cost_of
_Cyber_Crime_Study_-_Global.pdf. DoS attacks are “coordinated attempts to overwhelm a
given network resource (e.g., a Web server) with malicious traffic or requests for information
to such an extent that legitimate traffic cannot get through.” NAT’L RES. COUNCIL & NAT’L
ACAD. OF ENG., TOWARD A SAFER AND MORE SECURE CYBERSPACE 201 (Seymour E. Goodman
and Herbert S. Lin eds., 2007), https://www.nitrd.gov/fileupload/files/NRC_Toward_a_Saf
er_and_More_Secure_CyberspaceFull_report.pdf [hereinafter NRC REPORT]. These attacks
are commonly carried out using “botnets,” which are “collections of compromised computers
that are remotely controlled by a malevolent party.” Id. at 40.
4.
Lily Hay Newman, What We Know About Friday’s Massive East Coast Internet Outage,
WIRED (Oct. 21, 2016, 1:04 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/10/internet-outage-ddos-dnsdyn/.
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was sending an estimated 1.2Tbps of traffic to the company’s
servers.5
Akamai estimates that, following a DoS attack, the technical support and damaged asset costs alone can be more than $100,000.
That figure does not include revenue lost due to downtime or other
business disruptions.6 The mounting cost of these attacks is one of
many reasons why cybersecurity is now a top priority for businesses,
policymakers, and investors around the world.7 But what the Krebs
attack exemplified is that connected devices, commonly referred to
as the Internet of Things (“IoT”), are increasingly being hacked
and used to carry out devastating and costly cyberattacks. Use of
these devices is becoming more widespread every year; reports estimate that by 2020, IoT devices will make up 24 billion out of the 34
billion devices connected to the Internet.8
Recent Internet security reports indicate that malicious software
that can “take advantage of IoT architecture” has already been developed. Akamai predicted in mid-2016 that, “[i]n the near future,
attacks may source from automated homes or vehicles.”9 As it
turned out, Akamai’s prediction came true within a few months.
Once his site was back online, Krebs mused that, rather than being
taken down by some “space-based weapon of mass disruption,” his
site was attacked “with the help of a botnet that has enslaved a large
number of hacked so-called [IoT] devices—mainly routers, IP cameras and digital video recorders (DVRs) that are exposed to the
5.
CHRISTIAAN BEEK ET AL., MCAFEE LABS, THREATS REPORT: APRIL 2017 16 (2017),
https://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-quarterly-threats-mar-2017.pdf. According to subsequent analysis, this was the highest volume of traffic ever recorded in a DoS
attack. Id. The Dyn attack was carried out by the “Mirai botnet,” which, as of April 2017, had
infected more than 2.5 million devices. Id. at 31.
6.
PONEMON INST., supra note 3, at 1 fig.1.
7.
See SHARED ASSESSMENTS, THE INTERNET OF THINGS (IOT): A NEW ERA OF THIRD-PARTY
RISK (2017), http://sharedassessments.org/internet-things-iot-new-era-third-party-risk/;
Bruce Schneier, Your Wi-Fi Connected Thermostat Can Take Down the Whole Internet. We Need New
Regulations, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/
wp/2016/11/03/your-wifi-connected-thermostat-can-take-down-the-whole-internet-we-neednew-regulations/ (describing how IoT vulnerabilities recently disrupted the operations of
major websites including Twitter and Paypal). States have also begun to recognize the scope
of the problem and to craft new legislative solutions that impose security standards on IoT
manufacturers. See Jazmine Ulloa, This California Lawmaker Wants to Crack Down on Toys and
Electronics That Pick Up Conversations and Personal Information, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-california-state
-bill-aims-to-prevent-1490914171-htmlstory.html.
8.
John Greenough, How the ‘Internet of Things’ Will Impact Consumers, Businesses, and
Governments in 2016 and Beyond, BUS. INSIDER (Jul. 18, 2016, 10:24 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-the-internet-of-things-market-will-grow-2014-10.
9.
Akamai Techs., Q2 2016 Report, 3 ST. OF THE INTERNET / SECURITY, no. 2, 2016, at 40,
https://www.akamai.com/us/en/multimedia/documents/state-of-the-internet/akamai-q22016-state-of-the-internet-security-report.pdf.
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Internet and protected with weak or hard-coded passwords.”10
Krebs issued his own ominous warning in that same post:
The reality is that there are currently millions—if not tens of
millions—of insecure or poorly secured IoT devices that are
ripe for being enlisted in these attacks at any given time. And
we’re adding millions more each year.11
Given the tremendous costs incurred by victims of DoS and other
network attacks, the central role that connected devices play in
these attacks, and the large number of potential bystander victims,
it is likely that there will be a steady rise in IoT-related litigation.12
Products liability could provide a useful model to address injuries
caused by insecure IoT devices.
While the application of products liability to insecure software is
a frequently-discussed concept in academic literature, many commentators have been skeptical of the viability of such claims for
several reasons.13 First, the economic loss doctrine bars recovery for
productivity loss, business disruption, and other common damages
caused by software defects. Second, the application of design defects principles to software is difficult given the complexity of the
devices and recent tort reform trends that have limited liability.
Third, the intervening cause of damage from insecure software is
typically a criminal or tortious act by a third party, so principles of
causation might limit liability for manufacturers.
Even though discussions of liability for defective software go back
more than forty years,14 very few cases have addressed the issue
10. Krebs, supra note 2; see also Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, How 1.5 Million Connected
Cameras Were Hijacked to Make an Unprecedented Botnet, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Sept. 29, 2016,
12:03 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/15-million-connected-cameras-dd
os-botnet-brian-krebs.
11. Krebs, supra note 2.
12. We have already seen an uptick in data breach suits over the last five years as the
frequency of such incidents has increased. See Robert D. Fram, Simon J. Frankel & Amanda
C. Lynch, Standing in Data Breach Cases: A Review of Recent Trends, BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 9,
2015), http://www.bna.com/standing-data-breach-n57982063308/ (summarizing many data
breach cases filed in the last ten years).
13. See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of
Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1553, 1577 (2005) (noting that “it seems unlikely that the
courts adopting the Restatement will be receptive to stretching product liability concepts to
software, digital information, and other intangibles.”).
14. See Frances E. Zollers et al., Landings for Software: Liability for Defects in An Industry
That Has Come of Age, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 745, 745 n.1, 756 n.57
(2005) (listing articles dating back to 1971 that have “speculated” about liability for various
types of defective software); see also Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability for Insecure Software, 67 MD.
L. REV. 425, 469 n.267 (2008) (summarizing calls to impose strict liability during the last
twenty years); Michael Rustad, The Commercial Law of Internet Security, 10 HIGH TECH. L. J. 213,
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outside the financial services context. However, the proliferation of
IoT devices could be the catalyst for a new field of “connected devices” products liability law for several reasons. First, these attacks
cause significant damage to property and are highly foreseeable
given the widely acknowledged insecurity of IoT devices and numerous high-profile attacks. Second, IoT devices are often fully
capable of being updated and secured remotely by the manufacturer; patching well-known security flaws could significantly reduce
the risk of future attacks. And third, holding manufacturers liable
for downstream harms caused by their insecure devices is well aligned with the purposes of products liability law—to minimize
harm by encouraging manufacturers (as a least-cost-avoider) to invest in security measures.

I. PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING LIABILITY

FOR

PRODUCT DEFECTS

Products liability can be imposed on manufacturers and others
involved in distributing commercial products that cause injuries.
These claims can be pursued under theories of negligence, strict
liability, or breach of warranty.15 The core inquiry in products liability cases is whether the injuries were caused by a defect. Courts have
long imposed liability on those “engaged in the business of selling
or otherwise distributing . . . a defective product” where “harm to
persons or property [is] caused by the defect.”16
Products liability simultaneously serves two broad goals: (1) to
compensate those injured by unsafe products and (2) to provide
incentives for companies to take reasonable precautions in the design and manufacture of their products.17 The basic policy rationale
underlying all products liability law is that the manufacturer is in
the best position to prevent harm from defects.18 There are three
258 n.220 (1995) (listing prior commentators who have recommended extending strict products liability to defective software dating back more than thirty years).
15. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 13, at 1576.
16. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). There has
been much dispute amongst courts, scholars, and legislators about the precise contours of
products liability. This brief introduction is not meant to be a comprehensive overview of all
products liability law. Instead, I will offer a quick summary of the basic tort law and economic
principles underlying design defects.
17. Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1503, 1533
(2013).
18. Zollers et al., supra note 14, at 768 (discussing the rationale adopted in Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963)); see also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 353, at 975–76 (2000); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 4–5 (1987).
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discrete categories of product defect that give rise to liability in different circumstances: manufacturing defects, design defects, and
defective or inadequate warnings.19 Software defects have typically
been seen as design defects, though in some cases harm could be
caused by a “random failing or imperfection” in a software product,
and thus be deemed a manufacturing defect.20
The downside of relying on a design defect theory is that there
are significant disagreements over the necessary standard for proving that a product was defectively designed.21 The Third Restatement
adopts a “risk-utility” test, similar to the famous Learned Hand
formula (B < PL), to determine whether the “foreseeable risks of
harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by
the adoption of a reasonable alternative design.”22 This test typically
boils down to “[a] ‘micro-balance’ of pros and cons of a manufacturer’s failure to adopt some particular design feature that would
have prevented plaintiff’s harm.”23
The alternative to the risk-utility test is the “consumer expectations” test, adopted by some courts, which seeks to answer whether
the product “failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer
would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable
manner.”24 While adoption of the risk-utility standard involves importing a negligence concept into a “strict liability” regime, the
consumer expectations test can be just as problematic when applied
to products that pose obvious risks or involve “relatively complex
design.”25 Unlike design defects, the liability for manufacturing defects is truly strict, and the Third Restatement makes clear that the nofault liability serves several important goals: (1) creating safety incentives, (2) discouraging consumption of risky products, (3)
reducing transaction costs in litigation, and (4) fairness in assigning
liability to the party best equipped to spread the loss.26
Traditionally, the defectiveness of a physical good has been measured at the time of sale, and courts have not imposed a strict duty
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
20. Sales, supra note 17, at 1533; see Stephen R. Brenneman, Computer Malfunctions—
What Damages May Be Recovered in a Tort Product Liability Action, 2 Santa Clara Computer &
High Tech. L.J. 271, 279 (1986); Scott, supra note 14, at 468–70.
21. See, e.g., Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2014) (attempting to resolve
the common law test for design defects in Pennsylvania based on conflicting interpretations
in the Second Restatement, the Third Restatement, and prior case law).
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1998); Scott, supra
note 14, at 467.
23. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW 315 (2d ed. 2008).
24. Tincher, 104 A.3d at 368.
25. Tincher, 104 A.3d at 388.
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
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to insure harms caused by conditions that arise after the sale is completed.27 However, both the Third Restatement and more than half of
the states have adopted an affirmative post-sale duty to warn.28 The
post-sale duty to warn, like the Third Restatement’s design defect test,
is premised on a risk-utility analysis. The risk of harm must be “sufficiently great to justify the burden of providing a warning.”29 There
must also be a way to identify “those to whom a warning might be
provided” and some mechanism for the warning to be “effectively
communicated.”30 The seller’s decision regarding a post-sale warning is ultimately judged based on their knowledge (or imputed
knowledge) and whether a “reasonable person” in their position
would provide a warning.31 Courts are more likely to impose a postsale duty to warn where the manufacturer maintains a post-sale relationship and contact with the user who needs to be warned.32
Ultimately, the problem of insecure devices and networks is precisely the kind of issue that strict products liability was designed to
solve.33 Liability for cyberattacks would be “predictably ineffective if
directly applied to a class of bad actors,” and the manufacturers of
insecure devices are in a much better position to “mitigat[e] the
damage they cause.”34 It is especially appropriate “in cases where
liability can encourage a party to internalize some significant negative externality associated with its activities.”35 The National
Academy of Sciences emphasized in its comprehensive review of
cybersecurity threats that, as IoT devices proliferate, it is even more
important for “information technology systems and networks [to
be] adequately protected.”36 The Academy warned that the risks
created by insecure devices will not only contribute to widespread
harm, but will also cause other businesses and customers to “deem
it unacceptably risky to increase their reliance on [these] insecure
27. DAVID G. OWEN & MARY J. DAVIS, OWEN & DAVIS ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1:15 (4th
ed. 2014).
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 10 (AM. LAW INST. 1998); Jill Wieber
Lens, Warning: A Post-Sale Duty to Warn Targets Small Manufacturers, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 1013,
1014, 1020 n.24.
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 10(b)(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1998)
30. Id. §§ 10(b)(2)–(3).
31. Id. § 10(b)(1).
32. Lens, supra note 28, at 1027.
33. See Zollers et al., supra note 14; see also Doug Lichtman & Eric P. Posner, Holding
Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 221, 233–40 (2006) (outlining
justifications for imposing “indirect” liability on internet service providers).
34. Lichtman & Posner, supra note 33, at 223.
35. Id.
36. NRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 41.
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technologies.”37 It is ultimately a question of how, not why, liability
should attach for insecure devices that contribute to cyberattacks.38

II. THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE
One potential limit to products liability is the economic loss doctrine, which has traditionally barred recovery for certain financial
harms. Prior articles about potential liability for defective software
have noted that some of the most common types of damage caused
by software defects—such as loss of use of the software and consequential damages to business—would not be recoverable under the
economic loss doctrine. But recent developments in the law and
literature support the conclusion that the types of damage caused
by insecure IoT devices would not be excluded under the rule.
The economic loss rule has long been a source of confusion and
disagreement among courts and tort scholars.39 In an effort to address these disagreements, the American Law Institute has begun
work on a proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic
Harm.40 The first principle outlined in the proposed restatement is
that “[a]n actor has no general duty to avoid the unintentional infliction of economic loss on another.”41 As the comments to the first
section make clear, this is meant to establish a more limited principle than the economic loss rule that has been adopted by a
minority of courts.42 The minority view has been that “there is generally no liability in tort for causing pure economic loss to
another.”43 Rather than bar all liability for pure economic loss, the
comments to the proposed restatement make clear that while the
37. Id. at 42.
38. See Bruce Schneier, Liability and Security, CRYPTO-GRAM NEWSL. (Apr. 15, 2002),
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0204.html#6. There is already broad support for the
proposition that some liability should attach to such activities. See Shuba Ghosh & Vikram
Mangalmurti, Curing Cybersecurity Breaches Through Strict Products Liability in SECURING PRIVACY
IN THE INTERNET AGE 187, 192 (Anupam Chander et al. eds., 2008); BRENT ROWE ET AL., INST.
FOR HOMELAND SEC. SOLUTIONS, THE ROLE OF INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS IN CYBER SECURITY
(2011) https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ca45/575aee631a162e3c0d62d955fbb86bd
33df9.pdf; Lichtman & Posner, supra note 33, at 21; Rustad & Koenig, supra note 13 (outlining a proposal for how to impose liability under a new tort theory); Sales, supra note 17, at
1538–39; Scott, supra note 14, at 467–68.
39. See generally Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-line Function of the Economic Loss Rule,
66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 523 (2009); David W. Opderbeck, Cybersecurity, Data Breaches, and the
Economic Loss Doctrine in the Payment Card Industry, 75 MD. L. REV. 935 (2016).
40. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 1, 2012) [hereinafter ECONOMIC HARM RESTATEMENT DRAFT NO. 1].
41. Id. § 1(a).
42. Id. § 1 cmt. b.
43. Id.
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“duties of care with respect to economic loss are not general in
character,” they will be recognized in specific circumstances.44
There is no presumption against the existence of these duties, but
merely an acknowledgement that such duties “require justification
on more particular grounds than duties to avoid causing physical
harm.”45
The restatement defines “economic loss” as “pecuniary damage
not arising from injury to the plaintiff’s person or from physical
harm to the plaintiff’s property.”46 The rationale offered for this
distinction is twofold. First, “[e]conomic losses proliferate” and are
not self-limiting or predictable in the same way as physical injuries
and thus create a risk of indeterminate liability.47 Second, “[r]isks
of economic loss tend to be especially well-suited to allocation by
contract.”48 But the restatement also cautions that in some cases the
plaintiff “is in a poor position to allocate the risk of economic loss
by contract” and that a “court should not labor under a presumption against liability when the rationales for restricting it are
absent.”49 Economic losses can also be more narrowly defined as
those stemming from a “condition that may disappoint the purchaser’s expectations as to [a product’s] efficacy or fitness for the
purposes intended.”50 Early cases involving malfunctioning computer hardware and software were dismissed on that basis.51
The economic loss rule has long been viewed as an impediment
to products liability claims arising from defective software.52 This
was likely true for the type of software defect claims that early commentators envisioned, since the damage they predicted included
inoperable systems, business interruption, or other harms associated with loss of use of the software itself. Unlike defective business
software or other products previously considered, the security vulnerabilities that plague IoT devices threaten damage to private
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. § 2.
47. Id. § 1 cmt. c(1).
48. Id. § 1 cmt. c(2).
49. Id. § 1 cmt. e.
50. W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 95, at 678
(5th ed. 1984).
51. Zollers et al., supra note 14, at 757.
52. See Ghosh & Mangalmurti, supra note 38, at 192 (describing the “difficulty” in imposing tort liability in cyberspace due to “the reluctance of tort law to embrace the notion of
economic harms as a form of personal harm”); Jeffrey D. Neuburger & Maureen E. Garde,
Information Security Vulnerabilities: Should We Litigate or Mitigate?, 21 ANDREWS COMPUTER & INTERNET LITIG. REP. 13, at *5 (2004); Opderbeck, supra note 39, at 938 (describing the debate
over the economic loss doctrine including those who view the doctrine as an impediment);
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 13, at 1580; Sales, supra note 17, at 1535; Scott, supra note 14.
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property and create unique risks to innocent bystanders that should
support recovery.
Applying the proposed restatement principles to the problem of
injuries caused by insecure IoT devices will be somewhat complex,
but the restatement principles appear to favor recovery for the
types of damages likely to be caused by cyberattacks. The comments
to the proposed restatement clarify that “property damage” means
“damage to tangible property,” but also acknowledges that even
“relatively minor damage to person or property” can give rise to
liability for related monetary losses.53 A recent report on the financial impact of DoS attacks estimated that the per-hour cost of an
attack is $40,000 and that the average attack costs as much as
$500,000.54 The report found that more than fifty percent of the
companies surveyed “had to replace hardware or software” as a result of the attack, fifty percent “had a virus or malware installed/
activated on their network,” thirty-three percent suffered “consumer data theft,” and nineteen percent suffered “intellectual
property loss.”55
Most of these damages caused by DoS attacks could be fairly construed as “property damage” because they include destruction or
interference with specific network devices, software, and other electronic property (including sensitive data). The destruction and/or
theft of this property could not be characterized as a “purely economic loss.” On the other hand, the type of business losses
described in the Incapsula survey and the Akamai report, including
“loss of customer trust” and “lost user productivity” would likely
meet the definition of “economic loss” and not be recoverable absent damage to property.56
Given the rationale of the economic loss doctrine, it is especially
appropriate to permit products liability claims brought by bystander victims who would not have any contractual remedies
against the manufacturer. In fact, modern products liability law began with the recognition of claims brought by victims despite their
lack of privity with the defective product’s manufacturer.57 The Second Restatement noted the “social pressure” that gave rise to products
53. ECONOMIC HARM RESTATEMENT DRAFT NO. 1, supra note 40, § 2 cmt. a.
54. TIM MATTHEWS, INCAPSULA, SURVEY: WHAT DDOS ATTACKS REALLY COST BUSINESSES, 5
(2014) (ebook) https://lp.incapsula.com/rs/incapsulainc/images/eBook%20-%20DDoS
%20Impact%20Survey.pdf.
55. Id.
56. Id.; PONEMON INST., supra note 3, at 7.
57. See generally OWEN & DAVIS, supra note 27, §1:11; William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon
the Citadel, 69 YALE L. J. 1099 (1960).

922

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 50:4

liability was “a consumers’ pressure,” but declined to express “approval [or] disapproval” for the extension to bystanders.58 While
the Second Restatement did not directly address the question of
whether bystanders could bring products liability claims, subsequent cases have almost unanimously allowed recovery by
foreseeable bystanders.59
III. PROXIMATE CAUSE

AND

FORESEEABILITY

The main difference between the injuries to foreseeable bystanders in prior products liability cases and the injuries suffered by
victims of cyberattacks is the intervening actions of third party hackers.60 Proof of proximate cause has previously been seen as an
impediment to cybersecurity-related products liability claims.61 Ultimately, the question of proximate cause in a cyberattack bystander
case would likely turn on the foreseeability of the harm given the
nature of the insecure product defect.62 Foreseeability has been described as the “dominant test of proximate cause” and the “dark
matter of tort.”63
Proximate cause is the primary mechanism used by judges to
limit the scope of liability for “remote” harms, but the concept has
never been well defined.64 Whether an intervening criminal event
will break the causal chain depends upon “whether the type of intervention was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
product defect.”65 The reasonable foresight doctrine of probable
cause traces back to the famous Palsgraf case in which Judge Cardozo held that a railroad guard could not be liable for a remote
harm caused to a bystander on the platform.66 In Palsgraf, a railroad
guard pushed a man who had just jumped aboard a departing train,
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. o (AM. LAW. INST. 1965).
59. OWEN & DAVIS, supra note 27, § 5.5, § 5.5 n.40 (reviewing bystander liability cases
decided since the Second Restatement).
60. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 13, at 1602.
61. See Scott, supra note 14, at 450–53.
62. See Prosser, supra note 57, at 1143 (“A more difficult problem is that of what Professor Ehrenzweig has called ‘typicality’ of the injury. Put in more ordinary language, this means
the foreseeability of the harm—the seller’s reasonable anticipation of it as a normal consequence of the consumption or use of his product if it should turn out to be defective. It is the
sort of issue that is likely to be buried under the name of ‘proximate cause.’ ”).
63. David G. Owen, Figuring Foreseeability, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1277, 1277 (2009);
Meiring de Villiers, Foreseeability Decoded, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 343, 344 (2015).
64. OWEN, supra note 63, at 1293; see Rustad & Koenig, supra note 13, at 1601. See generally JOSEPH A. PAGE, TORTS: PROXIMATE CAUSE (2003); Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause Decoded,
50 UCLA L. REV. 293 (2002).
65. OWEN & DAVIS, supra note 27, § 1:16.
66. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 105 (N.Y. 1928).
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causing him to drop a package that contained fireworks, which
then exploded. This caused scales at the other end of the platform
to fall and injure the plaintiff.67 But unlike the guard in Palsgraf,
companies that manufacture and distribute IoT products have ample notice that these devices might have significant security defects
and that insecure devices are frequently used to carry out damaging
cyberattacks.
Proximate cause and the foreseeability principle ultimately ensure that only a party who has a choice between alternative courses
of action and chooses, “by some standard, incorrectly,” can be held
liable.68 For example, the foreseeability test recently adopted in the
Third Restatement, commonly referred to as the “risk standard,” is
based on “the idea that an actor should be held liable only for harm
that was among the potential harms—the risks—that made the actor’s conduct tortious.”69 Despite its precise formulation, the
doctrine of foreseeability is broad enough to encompass considerations of “policy, practicality, and case-specific fairness.”70
Professor Grady has explained the reasonable foresight test as,
ultimately, addressing whether there is “a merely coincidental relationship” between the accident and the defendant’s breach of
duty.71 In contrast, the direct consequences doctrine “examines
concurrent causes to see whether the person responsible for the
second cause has cut off the liability of the person responsible for
the first cause.”72 One subset of direct consequences cases are those
cases where a defendant “negligently create[s] tempting opportunities for judgment-proof people” to cause harm.73 One example is
the case of Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., which involved a defendant
radio DJ who ran a contest where he would travel around Los Angeles in a fast car and give prizes to the first listener to reach him.74
The defendant was jointly liable when two teenage listeners, racing
at high speeds, injured a plaintiff’s family member.75 Weirum is an
example of what Professor Grady refers to as a “free radicals” case,
where the court must determine whether “a reasonable person in
the defendant’s position, before the accident, must have been able
67.
68.
69.
d. (AM.
70.
71.
72.
73.
cases).
74.
75.

Id. at 99.
Owen, supra note 63, at 1280.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt.
LAW INST. 2010)
Owen, supra note 63, at 1293.
Grady, supra note 64, at 299.
Id.
Id. at 306 (Professor Grady categorizes these as EFR (Encourage Free Radicals)
539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975).
Id. at 38–40.
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to foresee that his act or omission would likely encourage free
radicals.”76
As Professor Grady has explained, the core principle of the proximate cause test is that “[r]esponsible people should avoid creating
opportunities for irresponsible people to do harm.”77 That is
precisely what is not happening in the IoT marketplace—manufacturers who distribute IoT devices are failing to provide adequate
security, and are therefore creating opportunities for hackers to use
the devices to harm innocent bystanders. Ultimately, a judge’s determination of whether to extend liability to vendors of insecure
devices will turn on an evaluation of the desirability, fairness, and
likely deterrent impact that such liability would have on
manufacturers.78
The combination of the heavy losses suffered by victims of DoS
and other attacks and the significant role that insecure IoT devices
play in such attacks should justify an extension of products liability
to protect bystander victims. It would be hard to argue that victims
of network attacks are not “foreseeable bystanders” of these security
defects when industry and incident reports cite with increasing urgency the significant risks created by these insecure devices.79 These
security flaws are known defects, and the risk of third party hacking
caused by these defects has been well documented.
Mr. Krebs was not the first victim of a network attack carried out
by a so-called “zombie army” of hacked IoT devices, and he will not
be the last.80 In fact, victims of IoT-based attacks would not be the
first bystanders to recover for harms caused by defective software.
As Professors Rustad and Koenig described in their seminal article
on tort liability for cybercrime, courts have had no problem imposing liability where defective software causes physical injury or
76. Grady, supra note 64, at 308.
77. Grady, supra note 64, at 295.
78. See Owen, supra note 63, at 1293; Rustad & Koenig, supra note 13, at 1602 n.251
(discussing Judge Andrews’s dissent in Palsgraf).
79. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD 12 (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federaltrade-commission-staff-report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/1501
27iotrpt.pdf; Akamai Techs., supra note 9; Dick O’Brien, The Internet of Things: New Threats
Emerge in a Connected World, SYMANTEC OFFICIAL BLOG (Jan. 20, 2014), https://
www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/internet-things-new-threats-emerge-connected-world.
80. See Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, In the Future, Hackers Will Build Zombie Armies from
Internet-Connected Toasters, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (July 5, 2016, 8:30 AM), https://mother
board.vice.com/read/in-the-future-hackers-will-build-zombie-armies-from-internet-connec
ted-toasters (describing an attack on a jewelry store website carried out using 25,000 hacked
CCTV cameras and another attack several days later against three U.S. gaming companies
using 1,000 internet-connected cameras).
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death.81 For example, a man in Alabama successfully sued General
Motors after a defective computer chip caused his truck engine to
stall in the middle of an intersection, which led to his car being hit
by a tractor trailer, killing his grandson.82 While DoS attacks may
not cause the same type of bodily injuries, they are still proximate
causes of severe property damage and should be considered reasonably foreseeable given the widespread recognition of the risks they
pose.

IV. TOWARDS LIABILITY

FOR

DEFECTIVELY INSECURE DEVICES

Insecure devices pose a significant threat to internet security in
general, to destruction of digital assets and network infrastructure
in particular, and to the population as a whole. As early as 2007 the
National Academy of Sciences recognized the scope of the problem. In the preface to their comprehensive report on cybersecurity,
the Chair acknowledged that, given the important role of internet
infrastructure in the global economy, it is:
in the public interest to have a safe and secure cyberspace. Yet
cyberspace in general, and the Internet in particular, are notoriously vulnerable to a frightening and expanding range of
accidents and attacks by a spectrum of hackers, criminals, terrorists, and state actors who have been empowered by
unprecedented access to more people and organizations than
has ever been the case with any infrastructure in history. Most
of the people and organizations that increasingly depend on
cyberspace are unaware of how vulnerable and defenseless
they are, and all too many users and operators are poorly
trained and equipped. Many learn only after suffering attacks.
These people, and the nation as a whole, are paying enormous
costs for relying on such an insecure infrastructure.83
The report predicted that the cybersecurity risks created by the
proliferation of “pervasive computing” (IoT) devices would require
“security solutions and approaches to scale upward by many orders
of magnitude.”84 The report specifically identified the need for embedded systems to enable “evolution of security” through “remote
81.
82.
83.
84.

Rustad & Koenig, supra note 13, at 1578.
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Johnston, 592 So. 2d 1054 (Ala. 1992).
NRC REPORT, supra note 3, at xi.
Id. at 197.
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upgrade[s]” in order to adjust to rapid changes in technologies and
capabilities.85
Insecure IoT devices pose a unique problem that products liability law is well positioned to address, but that will require adjusting
the standard defect paradigm applied by courts. Many devices, like
the ones used to attack the Krebs site, are vulnerable because they
are configured to be administered with default credentials, and can
easily be identified and accessed by malicious hackers.86 These default settings are not difficult or costly to change, so a failure to take
such precautions would likely be deemed a design defect. But other
vulnerabilities, such as those caused by coding errors embedded in
basic protocols common across different devices or services, can be
more difficult to identify or fix.87
Some have argued that software vulnerabilities are more akin to
manufacturing defects and could fit within that existing strict liability regime.88 Fundamental flaws that are hard to detect might more
appropriately be treated as manufacturing defects under a strict liability regime. It might be possible, for example, to argue that
certain types of coding errors and oversights (such as “buffer overflow” vulnerabilities89) are akin to manufacturing defects. This may
not be a perfect fit for many IoT security flaws, but certain types of
vulnerabilities could be treated as random errors in the software
production line akin to those likely to cause an exploding soda bottle.90 Imposing strict liability in such cases would have the added
benefit of encouraging manufacturers to insure against the loss and
therefore spread the cost more evenly across the industry rather
than forcing innocent bystanders to bear the risk.91
Given the nature of software vulnerabilities, it is likely that most
insecure IoT products liability claims would be analyzed as design
85. Id. at 198.
86. See Zach Wikholm, “When Vulnerabilities Travel Downstream,” FLASHPOINT BLOG
(Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.flashpoint-intel.com/when-vulnerabilities-travel-downstream/.
87. See Bruce Schneier, The Internet of Things is Wildly Insecure—And Often Unpatchable,
WIRED (Jan. 6, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/01/theres-no-good-way-topatch-the-internet-of-things-and-thats-a-huge-problem.
88. See Scott, supra note 14, at 469–70 (detailing the debate over whether to impose
strict liability on software vulnerabilities).
89. See generally Peter Bright, How Security Flaws Work: The Buffer Overflow, ARS TECHNICA
(Aug. 25, 2015, 9:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/how-security-flawswork-the-buffer-overflow/ (explaining “butter flow” vulnerabilities).
90. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (holding bottling company liable for harm caused by an exploding bottle).
91. Emmett Vaughn & Therese Vaughn, Fundamentals of Risk and Insurance 126 (10th
ed. 2007).
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defect claims.92 But the design defect paradigm still leaves much to
be desired. Courts are largely split over the question of what standard to apply in design defect cases.93 This uncertainty will make it
more difficult to resolve insecure IoT products liability claims and
could make outcomes more random or incentivize forum shopping
by plaintiffs and defendants. Still, regardless of whether courts apply the traditional Second Restatement test, the risk-utility test, the
consumer expectations test, or some mix of all three, many of these
vulnerabilities are so egregious that they will meet any standard.
The consumer expectations test is likely the most difficult to apply to insecure software defect claims because the test is poorly
suited to address defects in complex systems.94 Consumers, especially those purchasing IoT devices, do not typically have an
understanding of how their devices function, their role in the internet ecosystem, or the significance of any security vulnerabilities
embedded in those systems. A purchaser of a DVR (or a webcam, or
a “smart” refrigerator) likely does not have any expectations about
how the software in that device will function. So long as the device
carries out the tasks that that the user expects, the user is not likely
to think about what software is embedded in the device or how the
software was developed. If a device has been hacked and is simultaneously being used as part of a botnet to attack servers of a major
news site or gaming company, the user may not even be aware of
that fact.
The risk-utility test would provide a much better way to resolve
design defect claims for insecure IoT devices. Under the risk-utility
test, courts analyze whether the defect could have been avoided
through adoption of a reasonable alternative design. Because most
vulnerabilities are the result of unintentionally bad coding or poor
design choices (like weak default passwords and failure to follow
best practices), it would be straightforward to argue that an alternative software design could have enabled the same functionality
without creating the vulnerability. But the design defect analysis
would still be limited in time, focusing entirely on the pre-sale behavior of the manufacturer and not on their role in securing
devices post-sale.
Software vulnerabilities present an evolving problem, distinct
from most product defects that have been considered in the past.
92. See sources cited supra notes 14 and 52 (articles discussing the application of products liability principles to computer software).
93. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
94. See Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 388 (Pa. 2014).
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Unlike a Ford Pinto design that creates a risk of a gas tank explosion even in a minor traffic accident,95 an IoT device may not be
vulnerable, even in retrospect, at the time that it is designed or
sold. Security researchers and hackers are constantly discovering
new vulnerabilities, and these discoveries require software vendors
to update their software on a regular basis.96 These post-sale updates likely make software vendors even more likely to be liable for
downstream vulnerabilities than modern automobile manufacturers. In many cases, software companies have an even greater degree
of control over the downstream use of their products,97 and the
manufacturers’ ongoing post-sale involvement in monitoring and
maintaining that software increases their responsibility to address
defects down the line. Consider how often the average user of a
smartphone, laptop, app, or connected device receives or initiates a
software or firmware update compared to how infrequently most
car owners take their vehicle in to process a manufacturer’s recall.
Many manufacturers and vendors of IoT devices are also likely
have sufficient contact with their users to trigger a post-sale duty to
warn. Take, for example, a product like a “smart” home security
system that the user can remotely access and that the vendor can
remotely control.98 The vendor not only knows who the user is,
where they live, and how to contact them in the event of an emergency, the vendor also has direct control over the insecure device
itself.99 Such extensive post-sale contact with the user and control
over the product would almost certainly justify imposing a post-sale
95. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013,
1015–17 (1991).
96. See NRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 182 (“One key issue in the security of legacy systems
is patch management.”); Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Law and Economics of
Software Security, 30 HARV. J. L & PUB. POL’Y 283, 318 (2006) (“it has been widely recognized
that computer security is as much a management problem as it is a technology problem.”)
(footnote omitted) (quoting LAWRENCE A. GORDON ET AL., 2005 CSI/FBI COMPUTER CRIME
AND SECURITY SURVEY 14 (2005), http://www.firenetltd.it/materiale/FBI2005.pdf.); Dan J.
Klinedinst, Coordinating Vulnerabilities in IoT Devices, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INST.: CERT/CC
BLOG (Jan. 27, 2016), https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2016/01/coordinating-vulnerabili
ties-in-iot-devices.html; Why Security Updates Are Vital, NORTON, https://us.norton.com/vital-se
curity/article (last visited May 8, 2017).
97. But see Klinedinst, supra note 96 (“Companies like Microsoft and Google have public
ways to report vulnerabilities, standard methods of patching, bug bounty programs, and
other practices. However, many of the companies that make consumer products do not yet
have these practices in place.”).
98. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, ALARM.COM, https://www.alarm.com/get_started/
faq.aspx (last visited May 8, 2017).
99. Compare this to the automotive industry where there are several layers of removal
between the average customer and the manufacturer (e.g. the car dealer processing the sale
and the service station processing repairs).
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duty to warn about defects. But these contacts could also justify additional post-sale duties than have not previously been imposed on
vendors. On the other hand, many manufacturers of low-cost consumer electronic devices do not design their products with security
in mind and might not retain sufficient contacts to effectively patch
or mitigate vulnerabilities.100 This is the result of a “fundamental
market failure at work.”101
Another important question that could be raised in products liability cases related to insecure IoT devices is whether manufacturers
and vendors have a post-sale duty to patch insecure software. Unlike
in traditional duty-to-warn cases, the victim of a cyberattack likely
has no relationship to the manufacturer or the user who could be
warned of the defect post-sale. The user may not know or care that
their IoT device is insecure or that the device has been hacked, and
use of the device in a botnet to attack some innocent bystander
would not directly impact the user. Therefore, even if a manufacturer has a duty to warn the user, there is no guarantee that the
user will take affirmative steps to remedy the problem (like changing the default password or updating the software). Instead, it
would be more consistent with the underlying purposes of products
liability law to hold manufacturers liable if they fail to patch significant vulnerabilities that they know or should have known could
cause harm to others.102
Like the post-sale duty to warn under the Third Restatement, a
post-sale duty to patch could be evaluated under a risk-utility analysis based on what a reasonable person in the manufacturer’s
position would have done.103 Courts and commentators have recognized that the post-sale duty to warn imposes significant burdens on
manufacturers, but nevertheless over half the states have adopted
the Third Restatement approach.104 Commentators and legislators
100. See Klinedinst, supra note 96. In this sense, where IoT vendors fall on the “spectrum”
of post-sale contacts will be key in determining their post-sale duties. Some vendors have such
extensive contacts with users and control of devices that it would be reasonable to impose
new post-sale duties.
101. Understanding the Role of Connected Devices in Recent Cyber Attacks: Joint Hearings Before
Subcomm. on Commc’ns & Tech. and Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., & Trade of the H. Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 114th Cong. 3 (2016) (statement of Bruce Schneier, Fellow, BerkmanKlein Center at Harvard University), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20161116/
105418/HHRG-114-IF17-Wstate-SchneierB-20161116.pdf.
102. A more complex question would be whether a vendor’s potential liability is extinguished once they have given adequate warning to the user. This would likely depend on the
degree of direct control over the device and whether there was a reasonable and cost-effective way for the manufacturer to cure the defect directly via a patch. But the intervening act
of a user who rejects such a patch could also break the chain of proximate cause.
103. See supra note 28, 31 and accompanying text.
104. See Lens, supra note 28, at 1020–21.
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have already expressed concern over the potential impact that
cybersecurity regulations might have on innovation and technological advances.105 Still, the lack of clear legal standards and guiding
best practices for patch management has long been recognized as a
problem in securing critical infrastructure.106 Without a post-sale
duty to patch, it is not clear how a court could impose liability on a
company for failing to secure embedded software that is still in use.
Absent liability, innocent victims would have to bear the losses
caused by these unsafe products and manufacturers would not be
properly incentivized to take precautions; failing to impose liability
for these defects would run contrary to the core purposes of products liability law.107
CONCLUSION
The proliferation of insecure IoT devices poses a significant risk
to the Internet ecosystem in general, and to individual users and
companies that rely on Internet services in particular. These insecure devices have already been used to carry out high-profile
denial-of-service attacks on websites and service providers. Attacks
impose significant costs on innocent bystanders and will likely give
rise to litigation. A traditional products liability model could provide a means to adjudicate claims arising from injuries caused by
insecure devices. The most significant hurdles to insecure IoT products liability claims would be (1) the application of the risk-utility
defect test and (2) the reasonable foreseeability of the harm under
a proximate cause analysis. Many of the risks posed by insecure devices could be mitigated by imposing a post-sale duty to patch
vulnerable software, though legislators have so far been hesitant to
impose such regulations on software vendors. Regardless of the
mechanism, some manufacturers should bear that costs imposed by
the deployment of insecure devices so that vendors take adequate
precautions to prevent broad-scale harm to Internet users.

105. See Understanding the Role of Connected Devices in Recent Cyber Attacks: Joint Hearings
Before Subcomm. on Commc’ns & Tech. and Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., & Trade of the H. Comm.
on Energy & Commerce, 114th Cong. 1–2 (2016) (Statement of Greg P. Walden, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Commc’ns & Tech. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce), http://docs.
house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20161116/105418/HHRG-114-IF17-MState-W000791-201611
16.pdf.
106. See COMM. ON CRITICAL INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE & THE LAW, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION AND THE LAW 50–51 (Stewart D. Personick & Cynthia A. Patterson eds., 2003).
107. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.

